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I. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights law is an optimistic enterprise. Although 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, its close cousin, 
arose in response to the worst atrocities humans are capable of 
committing, belief in the project of international human rights law 
represents a belief in the ability of reason to prevail over violence and 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. This essay is a revised 
version of a paper originally delivered in May 2002 at the International Conference on 
Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Prague. I am grateful to Steve Winter, Fuyuki Kurasawa, 
Steve Schiffrin, and Ed Baker for their helpful suggestions, and I am also grateful to my 
colleagues at the University of Virginia School of Law for their useful comments during a faculty 
workshop. I owe thanks in particular to Anne Coughlin, Richard Bonnie, and Paul Stephan. 
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terror. Human rights law is premised upon the idea that even the almost 
unimaginable extremes of human emotion and behavior can be made 
subject to the law's rationalizing power; that law can reach into the very 
heart of darkness, and make us better than we have so far proven to be. 
Of course, one might say that all law is part of a fundamentally 
optimistic enterprise. While it is a truism to observe that if humans were 
angels, law would be unnecessary, we could equally turn the truism 
around, and note that if humans were devils, law would be pointless. In 
this sense, the law-making project always presupposes the 
improvability, if not the perfectibility, of humankind. Whether our view 
of human nature tends towards Hobbesian grimness or Lockean 
equanimity, we tend to think of law as critical to reducing brutality and 
violence, or at least a distinct convenience in that regard. 
Our faith in the law is rarely tested, since in America, at least, few of 
us ordinary people ever find ourselves at the extremes, confronting 
violence and terror. But the extremes have a way of creeping up on us, 
and the unimaginable can quickly and imperceptibly begin to seem 
routine. Millions of ordinary Europeans discovered this in the middle of 
the last century, and thousands of ordinary Americans discovered it in 
Vietnam. Some Americans are discovering it again today in the 
mountains and deserts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Experientially, there is 
often no sharp dividing line between "ordinary" life and "ordinary" law, 
on the one hand, and the extremes, on the other. After Stalin, after Pol 
Pot, after the Balkan Wars and the Rwandan genocide, as well as the 
countless other smaller-scale conflicts around the globe, this truth 
should be apparent to us, but most of the time we prefer to forget or 
deny it. 
What I want to do in this essay is look closely at one example of law 
operating at the extreme edge of human behavior and emotion, and see 
whether it has anything particularly satisfying to offer those people who 
do find themselves caught in the dark places of the earth-or any 
lessons for those of us who have not so far been tested. 
The example I have in mind involves the first judgment handed down 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(better know as "the Hague Tribunal"). 1 It is the story of an ordinary 
man who found one day that the moral terrain around him had changed 
beyond recognition. It is also, of course, a story about law. The case, 
I. The Hague Tribunal's full title is "The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991." The court's jurisprudence is available on the 
Internet at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
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Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 2 was decided in 1997, but it has received only 
minimal attention in English-language journals. This is probably 
because, to many observers of the Tribunal, it seemed an unimportant 
and even disappointing case. It involved the wrongs of an obscure 
young Croatian soldier, not those of a general or a president, and its 
outcome, to many critics, was hardly a resounding or satisfying victory 
over the forces of evil. 
Nonetheless, it is a fascinating case. It addresses a particularly 
troublesome issue in criminal law: the scope of duress as a defense. This 
issue in turn leads to difficult questions about what law in general can 
offer us, what it is fair and reasonable to expect of ordinary human 
beings caught in terrible times, and whether we it is wise to assume a 
sharp discontinuity' between the ordinary and the extreme in life or in 
law. The Erdemovic case can be seen as a parable about the failure of 
law to live up to its optimistic promise (to protect humans from atrocity 
or provide guidance to those who wish to prevent atrocity). 
Alternatively, it can be seen as a parable about law's expressive and 
redemptive possibilities, even in the face of evil. It is these ambiguities 
that I want to explore here. 
II. ERDEMOVIC'S STORY 
Drazen Erdemovic was an ethnic Croat who lived in the Yugoslav 
republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1990, Erdemovic, aged 18, began 
his mandatory military service in the Yugoslav National Army, which 
was at that time still more or less multi-ethnic in composition. In 1992, 
voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina opted for independence from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (in a referendum in which most of the region's 
Bosnians and Croats participated, but most of the Serbs boycotted). The 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from 
Yugoslavia shortly thereafter, and Erdemovic, who had just finished his 
service with the Yugoslav National Army, was briefly mobilized into 
the new republic's army as civil war engulfed the region. In November 
1992, however, Erdemovic left the Bosnian army to serve with the 
Croatian Defense Council's police force. His tenure there was equally 
short. 
By all accounts, Drazen Erdemovic was an accidental and unwilling 
soldier, not a mercenary. He came from a pacifist, cosmopolitan 
background, and grew up with friends of many different ethnicities. He 
2. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, 
Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeaVjudgemcnt!erd-
aj971007c.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003). 
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opposed the war, and did not wish to fight; when he left the Croatian 
Defense Force, he sought work as a locksmith. He eventually married a 
Serbian woman he had known since childhood, and the young couple 
drifted around Serbia for a time, trying to find work and a place where a 
multi-ethnic family could live unmolested. They considered leaving the 
Balkans altogether, and tried to get visas to Switzerland, but papers 
were difficult to obtain. Finally, with his wife pregnant and his savings 
almost gone, Erdemovic turned to one of the few remaining sources of 
steady employment in the region, and in 1994 he enlisted once more, 
this time in the Bosnian Serb Army of Radovan Karadzic's self-
proclaimed "Republica Srpska," the Serb enclave within Bosnia. 
Although whispers of concentration camps, torture, and other 
atrocities had already reached well beyond the region, most of these 
rumored atrocities were attributed to vicious Serb paramilitaries and 
police, not to regular soldiers. When he joined up with the Bosnian Serb 
Army, Erdemovic asked to serve in the lOth Sabotage Detachment 
because its members included Croats as well as Serbs, and because it 
was not a combat unit but dealt instead with specialized munitions tasks. 
For a time, all went well; Erdemovic's wife bore a son, money came in, 
and Erdemovic's military duties were not too onerous.3 
On July 16, 1995, however, the lOth Sabotage Detachment was 
ordered to the Branjevo collective farm in Pilica, not far from the city of 
Srebrenica, for a mission that was not disclosed to the soldiers until five 
buses pulled up and several hundred captive Muslim men and boys were 
let off, hands tied together. The Muslims-all in civilian clothes-were 
lined up with their backs to the soldiers, and Erdemovic and his 
comrades were told that upon their commander's word, they were to 
shoot the civilians.4 
Drazen Erdemovic was incredulous. As he later told the judges of the 
Hague Tribunal's Trial Chamber, "I said immediately that I did not 
want to take part in that and I said, 'Are you normal? Do you know 
what you are doing?'"5 But Erdemovic's commander told him bluntly 
that he had a choice: he could participate in the executions of the 
Muslim civilians, or, if he felt "sorry for them," he could "stand up, line 
3. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. !T-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgement! 
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
4. See Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-A. 
5. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovie, Case No. IT-
96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997) at para. II, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appcal/judgcment!crd-asojstc971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2003). 
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up with them and we will kill you too. "6 
Faced with such a choice, Drazen Erdemovic reluctantly agreed to 
obey the order. He made one more effort to be merciful when he spotted 
an elderly man whom he recognized among the civilians. He told his 
commander that the man had helped save the lives of some Serbs on an 
earlier occasion, and suggested that at least his life might be spared. But 
his commander said that it was not possible to spare any of the civilians: 
none of them could be left alive as witnesses. 
At this, Erdemovic gave up his efforts to resist, and participated, 
however unwillingly, in the slaughter. He later told journalists that he 
tried to kill as few people as possible, and he made an effort not to shoot 
at the youngest victims.7 But the buses kept leaving and returning with 
more victims, and by the day's end, Erdemovic estimated that his 
bullets might have killed as many as seventy or eighty people. Soldiers 
of the lOth Sabotage Unit killed some 1200 civilians that day, a goodly 
fraction of the estimated seven thousand Srebrenica civilians 
slaughtered during the course of that week by the Bosnian Serb army.8 
Four months later, the Dayton Accords brought an ambiguous end to 
the war in Bosnia, and Drazen Erdemovic, now 25 years old, again 
found himself demobilized. But his personal war was not quite over. 
Erdemovic told his story to a journalist from the French newspaper Le 
Figaro, and informed her that he wanted to go to the Hague and tell his 
story there as well. 
He did not have to wait long. The story in Le Figaro caused a 
sensation; it was the first acknowledgement by any of the perpetrators 
that Europe's worst massacre since the Holocaust had indeed occurred.9 
In the wake of the Dayton Accords, Yugoslav premier Slobodan 
Milosevic was eager to throw a few bones to the international 
community. Handing over a general or a president like Ratko Mladic or 
Radovan Karadzic would be costly for Milosevic, but picking up a 
Croat foot soldier who seemed desperate to incriminate himself in any 
event was an easy way to keep everyone happy. Shortly after the Le 
Figaro article was published, Erdemovic was arrested by Yugoslav 
6. Sentencing Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis. 
7. See Charles Trucheart, U.N. Court Gives Bosnian Croat 10 Years for Part in Massacre; 
Croat Soldier is First Sentenced by U.N. Court, Austin-American Statesman, Nov. 30, 1996, at 
AI (citing a March 8, 1996, report by Renaud Girard for LE FIGARO); see also Amnesty 
International, Bosnia-Herzegovina; To Bury My Brothers' Bones, AI Index: EUR 63/15/96, Oct. 
7, 1996 (citing the Girard report along with an account reported by Vanesa Vasic'-Janekovic', for 
NAA BORBA, published Mar. 13 1996). 
8. Sentencing Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T. 
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, War Crimes Probe Pains Srebrenica Genocide; Charges Stir 
Range Of Emotions In Bosnian City, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1996. 
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authorities, 10 and promptly transferred to the Hague. 11 
At this point, the story of Drazen Erdemovic also becomes a story 
about law, and law's struggle to apply reason to terror. At the Hague, 
Erdemovic repeated and amplified the confession had had made to Le 
Figaro. His own confession was the only incriminating evidence against 
him, and prosecutors were at first somewhat reluctant to charge him; the 
Hague Tribunal had been established in 1992 with much fanfare and 
with pledges to bring to justice the most high-ranking perpetrators, and 
a conscience-stricken 25-year-old Croatian foot soldier was no one's 
idea of a good start. 12 In May 1996, however, Erdemovic was charged 
with one count of crimes against humanity and one count of war 
crimes. 13 
In November 1996 (after delays due partly to Erdemovic's shaky 
mental and emotional state), he pled guilty to the first charge. But as he 
entered his plea, he reiterated to the trial court that he had participated in 
the massacre only because he would have been killed if he had not. 
Done so. "Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have 
been killed together with the victims .. .I could not refuse because then 
they would have killed me." 14 
After his guilty plea, Erdemovic was sentenced by the trial court to 
ten years in prison. On appeal, his attorney argued that his guilty plea 
had been uninformed and equivocal, and that his statements should 
properly have been understood as a plea of not guilty because he had 
been under duress at the time he committed the acts charged.15 
This raised a novel question for the Tribunal: is duress (if proven) a 
complete defense to charges of crimes against humanity or war crimes, 
when the crimes at issue involve the killing of innocent people? The 
trial court had assumed that duress was not a complete defense, and 
could serve only as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Appeals 
Chamber, however, acknowledged that the precise scope of the defense 
of duress was ambiguous. The Chamber declared it a case of first 
10. Ironically, he was arrested on suspicion of committing war crimes by the same regime 
complicit in ordering those crimes committed. 
II. See, e.g., Serbia Delivers Witnesses to Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 
31, 1996, at AIO. 
12. I owe these insights into the inner workings at the Prosecutors office to a series of 1998 
conversations with Payam Akhavan, a former prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal. 
13. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22 (J.C.T.Y., Office of the 
Prosecutor, May 22, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/erd-ii96 
0529e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
14. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T (J.C.T.Y., Trial 
Chamber, Nov. 29, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgcmcntlerd-
tsj961129e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
15. I am skimming over the case's very complex procedural history here. 
2003] ATROCITY AND DURESS 867 
impression, and undertook to determine the appropriate international 
law rule relating to the scope of the duress defense. 16 
There was no issue of fact at stake. The Trial Chamber did not 
question Erdemovic's version of the story. 17 The prosecution stipulated 
that they accepted the truth of Erdemovic's version of events, and 
agreed that he probably would have been shot by his commander had he 
refused to take part in the slaughter; indeed, his commander had shot 
another man in the unit for disobeying orders. 18 Thus, the only question 
for the Appeals Chamber was whether duress should exonerate 
Erdemovic altogether or merely reduce his sentence. 
The judges of the Appeals Chamber agreed, after a survey of possible 
sources of international law on the issue-e.g., treaties, customary 
international law, decisions of previous tribunals of an international or 
transnational character such as the Nuremberg Tribunals-that there 
was no unambiguous international legal standard on the scope of the 
duress defense. The majority of the Appeals Chamber (Judges 
McDonald, Vohrah, and Li) then sought guidance from state practice, 
and concluded that while virtually all civil law jurisdictions surveyed 
permitted duress as a complete defense to all crimes, virtually all 
common law jurisdictions preclude the defense of duress to charges of 
murdering innocent people. 19 
The majority concluded that in light of the divide between common 
law and civil law jurisdictions, there was no useful "general principle of 
law recognized by civilized nations" that could be extrapolated from 
state practice.20 While they acknowledged a general principle that 
crimes committed under duress were less blameworthy than crimes 
committed without any duress or coercion, this did not resolve the 
question of whether an international criminal tribunal should properly 
treat duress as a complete defense or only as a mitigating factor. 
16. See Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Prosecutor v. 
Erdemovic, Case. No. IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojmcd971 007e.htm (last visited Nov. 
7, 2002). 
17. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. lT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdemovic/trialc/judgement/ 
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
18./d. 
19. The U.S. was the sole exception, since a few U.S. states have adopted the Model Penal 
Code approach, which essentially mirrors the civil law approach. Nonetheless, most U.S. states 
adopt the traditional common law approach, and the U.S. military retains the common law 
approach. The Manual for Courts-Martial states that duress "is a defense to any offense except 
killing an innocent person." R.C.M. 916(h), Manual for Courts Martial, United States (2000 ed). 
20. See Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdemovic, Case 
No. IT-96-22-A. 
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Ultimately, by a vote of 3-2, the majority of the Appeals Chamber 
decided to adopt the general common law rule.21 The plurality opinion 
by Justices McDonald and Vohrah declared that while duress might be a 
mitigating factor that would affect sentencing, duress was not a defense 
to charges of crimes against humanity. Drazen Erdemovic had properly 
entered a guilty plea; if duress existed, this might give rise to a lesser 
sentence, but no amount of duress could exonerate him altogether. 22 
In some ways this seems like an astonishing conclusion. Drazen 
Erdemovic had had no desire to kill innocent civilians, and he did so 
only when threatened with his own imminent death. In the context, his 
death would probably have served no purpose: the Muslim civilians 
would surely have been killed with or without Erdemovic's 
participation, and refusal to participate in the massacre would merely 
have added Erdemovic to the list of victims. In a sense, then, 
Erdemovic's acquiescence in the massacre could even be said to have 
reduced the total amount of death and suffering that would take place, 
since at least it ensured that his own corpse would not be added to the 
pile at the end of the day. Had he persisted in his refusal to participate in 
the massacre, his refusal would have injured him irreparably and 
benefited no one, but his participation in the massacre benefited him-it 
kept him alive-while injuring no one who would not have been injured 
anyway. 
Why then establish a legal standard disallowing the duress defense 
for Erdemovic? By establishing this standard, the majority of the 
Appeals Chamber essentially declared that Erdemovic's legal guilt was 
foreordained when he was ordered to Srebrenica. Erdemovic could only 
have preserved his legal innocence by sacrificing his life. At Srebrenica, 
the only way to be innocent was to be dead. 
Of course, the Tribunal was only following the rule on duress that 
prevails in virtually all common law jurisdictions. To some degree, the 
Tribunal's decision in the Erdemovic case was not any more astonishing 
than the various common law decisions over the centuries that have 
similarly insisted that duress is no defense to murder.23 But here I want 
to suggest that the traditional common law rule precluding duress as a 
defense to homicide is itself quite astonishing. The rule is not invoked 
often in "ordinary" life, since accused murderers rarely seek to claim 
duress as a defense. Nevertheless, the common law rule precluding 
21. Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A. 
22. Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdemovic, Case No. 
IT-96-22-A. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
924 (1993). 
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duress as a defense to homicide seems puzzling and anomalous in a way 
that little recent scholarship has addressed.24 
Ill. REASONABLENESS IN LAW 
To see the ways in which the general common law rule is anomalous, 
we have to place it against the background of legal understandings of 
"reasonableness." The idea of "reasonableness" is a critical standard in 
the law.25 In particular, it is the backdrop against which virtually all 
legal liability is assessed in tort and criminal law. This is so obvious to 
most lawyers that it is rarely discussed explicitly, except perhaps in the 
context of introductory courses for beginning law students. 
The importance of the concept of reasonableness is often rendered 
explicit in the statutory definitions of crimes. For instance, to be 
convicted of a crime in the United States, a defendant must be proven 
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." Criminal negligence under the U.S. 
Model Penal Code involves "a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."26 We 
find similar references to reasonableness in the laws of every state; in 
New York, to cite but a typical instance, to successfully plead self-
defense to avoid criminal liability for shooting someone, a defendant 
must show he "reasonably believe[d]" he was in immanent danger of 
death or serious bodily harm, and that he further "reasonably 
believe[ d]" that only his own use of force would deter that threat. 27 
Even when the word "reasonable" is not used in the statutory definition 
of crimes, judges often read in a "reasonableness" requirement. 
The use of reasonability as an all-purpose legal yardstick is so 
24. Even the ubiquitous Joshua Dressler has given the issue only passing attention. See 
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: JustifYing the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989). 
25. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW & OBJECTIVITY (1992); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL 
SYSTEM & LAWYERS' REASONINGS (1964); Neil MacCorrnick, Reasonableness & Objectivity, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575 (1999), observing: 
[W]hen we think of legal reasoning in the common law systems or in mixed 
systems ... the category of the reasonable has great importance and many uses .... In 
many branches of the law, "reasonableness" is the standard set by the operative 
principles and rules of conduct and of judgment.. .. (There is] a very general tendency to 
rely in the law upon the standard of reasonableness as a criteria of right decision 
making, of right action, and of fair interpersonal relationships. 
/d. at 1578-79. Anthropologist Max Gluckman claimed that "the reasonable man is recognized as 
the central figure of all developed systems of law." MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 83 (1967). Although, as Michael Saltman's 
work demonstrates (see MICHAEL SALTMAN, THE DEMISE OF THE REASONABLE MAN (1991)), 
Gluckman's observation appears to be something of an overstatement, it is not much of one. 
26. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)( d) (American Law In st. 1985) [hereinafter MPC]. 
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35 et seq. (McKinney 1998). 
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widespread that generations of American and British law students have 
become familiar with the mythic being known as the Reasonable Man. 
The law's "Reasonable Man" is a kind of paragon of normalcy: he 
exercises a reasonable degree of care as he goes about his daily 
activities. His emotions are reasonable and temperate, and on the rare 
occasions when he ceases to be temperate, his intemperance is no more 
than is reasonable under the circumstance. He is a bloodless, tidy sort on 
the whole, although in extreme circumstances (when he stumbles upon 
his wife and her lover in flagrante, for instance, or when he is attacked 
by a burglar), he occasionally gives way to an irresistible impulse and 
lashes out in anger or in fear. Still, the Reasonable Man's anger and fear 
are always proportionate to the provocation, and afterwards he returns 
to his normal state of carefulness and calm. His behavior never lands 
him in prison or subject to a hefty judgment, because the law tends to 
view him as the unsanctionable norm. 
These days, of course, law students soon learn that the Reasonable 
Man is not only a purely mythical beast, but sometimes a dangerous one 
as well. The concept of the reasonable man has been criticized not only 
as an artificial construct but as a construct that privileges certain modes 
of understanding and reacting over others. In particular, feminists and 
critical race theorists have drawn attention to the ways in which the 
"reasonableness" demanded by the law is often merely the typical 
attitudes of well-nourished white males. Even the gender neutral 
"Reasonable Person" frequently turns out to hold typically male 
attitudes. 
Some scholars have proposed more context-dependent notions of 
reasonableness, which might, on occasion, replace the reasonable 
person with the reasonable woman, or the reasonable battered woman, 
or the reasonable poor person, or the reasonable Asian immigrant, or the 
reasonable striking worker. These proposals are premised on the idea 
that there is no "one size fits all" type of reasonableness, and that broad 
categories of difference between persons merits legal recognition in the 
form of more nuanced and contextual conceptions of reasonableness. 
Nevertheless, this critique of the idea of the reasonable shares the 
assumption that when something goes wrong, legal liability can and 
should derive from deviations from the reasonable, as long as we can 
agree on the base characteristics of the reasonable person in a particular 
setting. 
We might distinguish between two somewhat different 
understandings of the term "reasonable." There is a weak sense of the 
word and a strong sense. First, much of the time, when we speak of the 
reasonable man (or reasonable woman, or reasonable poor person, etc.), 
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we are speaking in fact of the "ordinary," normal or typical man (or 
woman, or poor person, etc.); that is, someone who thinks, feels and 
behaves in an average sort of way. He or she may turn out not to be 
particularly "reasonable" in the sense of always reaching well-reasoned 
decisions, but even if his or her decisions are poorly reasoned, they are 
poorly reasoned in a way that is typical of the ordinary person. This first 
and weaker understanding of the "reasonable person" presumes a great 
bell curve applying to all realms of human behavior, and the reasonable 
person is the one we find at the bell curve's very middle. We may 
choose to imagine separate bell curves for men and for women, or for 
abused domestic partners, or for minorities, but on this conception of 
legal reasonableness, the reasonable person is always perched at the top 
of the bell curve. 
This conception of the reasonable person is unquestionably rather 
impoverished (and in some areas of law it is considered legally 
insufficient: doing whatever everyone else does will not necessarily 
prevent liability). But the weak conception of reasonableness has the 
virtue of being, at least hypothetically, more determinate than the 
various other ways we might understand the idea of reasonableness. 
After all, if the reasonable person is simply the average person (or 
perhaps the average person with certain characteristics or past 
experiences), we could determine whether a given defendant should be 
held liable by a more or less sophisticated study or opinion poll. Such a 
study or poll could presumably tell us what other similarly situated 
people do or believe they would do in the defendant's situation. 
If we think this conception of reasonableness as ordinariness is too 
impoverished, we can turn to a second conception of reasonableness, 
one that is more substantive and robust. We could insist that a 
defendant's potential liability should be measured not by what an 
average or typical person with his characteristics would have done in a 
similar situation, but by what an average person could or should have 
done. As one scholar puts it, this stronger conception of reasonableness 
means that: 
The reasonable person has the virtue of prudentia and uses this in 
action. [Reasonableness] is a virtue that is incompatible with 
fanaticism or apathy, but holds a mean between these, as it does 
between excessive caution and excessive indifference to risk. 
Reasonable people take account of foreseeable risks, but with 
regard to serious possibilities and probabilities, not remote or 
fanciful chances. They do not jump to conclusions, but consider 
the evidence and take account of different points of view. They 
are aware that any practical dilemma may involve a meeting 
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point of different values and interests, and they take the 
competing and converging values seriously .... "28 
In this stronger conception of the reasonable, the reasonable person is 
inevitably some species of utilitarian; reasonableness depends precisely 
upon the capacity to balance harms. This second understanding of 
"reasonableness" as a standard for imposing liability is a great deal 
more demanding. It insists that to avoid liability, a person must be 
reasonable not in the sense of being ordinary, but in the sense of 
thinking through his actions and their consequences in a thoughtful, 
reasoned way, and behaving in ways that are sensible, careful, and 
prudent. 
This conception of reasonableness is more nuanced and powerful, 
and consequently gives rise to new problems. How much care is 
enough? What reasons are good reasons? What risks are foreseeable? 
Which interests and values should come first? This understanding of 
reasonableness also seems to some critics to offer little when it comes to 
evaluating human emotions. In evaluating whether a defendant's use of 
force was legitimate in self-defense, for instance, the law may ask 
whether the defendant "reasonably feared" imminent bodily harm, or 
whether a woman's fear that she might be raped was a "reasonable 
fear."29 But what can it mean to ask whether someone's fear was 
"reasonable" when fear itself is an inherently "unreasonable" 
emotion?30 Similarly, when we deal with issues of provocation in 
criminal law, or emotional distress in tort law, we may be faced with 
questions such as whether a person "reasonably" felt shame or 
humiliation or disgust. Like fear, these emotions are not about reason at 
all. Although we can certainly ask whether a typical person in a similar 
setting would feel shame or fear, it is unclear what we gain by asking 
whether the emotion itself is reasonable, or whether the person could or 
should have felt otherwise. 
Much of the time, these two rather different conceptions of the 
reasonable person-the weak and the strong-are not clearly 
distinguished by courts. Courts often speak of what a "reasonable 
person" could have foreseen and of what was "reasonably foreseeable," 
as if these two statements are identical; they speak of whether a 
28. See MacConnick, supra note 25, at 1579. 
29. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev 'd by State v. Rusk, 
424 A.2d 720, 727 (Md. 1981) (reversing, the Court of Appeals for Maryland noted that "the vast 
majority of jurisdictions have required that the victim's fear be reasonably grounded." (emphasis 
added)). 
30. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum & Dan Kahan, Two Views of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996). 
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reasonable person would have felt outraged and of whether the outrage 
was reasonable; they speak of persons "of reasonable firmness," and of 
when the law can reasonably expect that a person of reasonable 
firmness will experience a reasonable fear. 31 
Nonetheless, all of these discussions of the concept of reasonableness 
and the reasonable person share a core assumption. They all take for 
granted the idea that you can be held legally responsible if your 
behavior was unreasonable in some way, whatever precisely is meant by 
"reasonable." Conversely, if your behavior was at all times 
reasonable-if a reasonable person would have done nothing other than 
what you did, or if it would have been unreasonable to expect you to 
have done other than what you did-you cannot and should not be held 
responsible. Certainly, when it comes to criminal law, at least, most 
scholars take this as a basic premise. 32 
IV. THE ANOMALOUS ASPECTS OF THE DURESS DEFENSE 
Against this backdrop, the common law rule precluding duress as a 
defense to charges of homicide seems peculiar. If someone puts a gun to 
your head and places another gun in your hand and says, "Shoot that 
person over there or I will blow your brains out," what would a 
reasonable person do? Assuming that the threat is credible and there is 
no doubt that the man with the gun to your head can and will blow your 
brains out if you disobey, it seems unlikely that most "ordinary" people 
would choose to accept death themselves rather than cause the death of 
a third party, at least if the third party is not known to them. In the 
weakest sense of "reasonableness as ordinariness," the reasonable thing 
to do is cooperate. In the strongest sense of the term reasonable, it 
seems unlikely that a prudent, thoughtful, careful person would choose 
her own death over another's death. In fact, it seems thoroughly 
unreasonable to expect anyone to sacrifice her own life in such 
circumstances.33 Yet this is just what the law apparently expects in most 
common law jurisdictions: a willingness to value the lives of others over 
one's own life, and to sacrifice one's own life, if necessary, for the good 
of another. A willingness to make such a sacrifice may be a virtue, but it 
31. This imprecision has also been much criticized, on the grounds that the purpose of a 
"reasonableness" standard is to provide some determinacy and objectivity in assessing legal 
liability. See GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 100-08. If the very idea of"reasonableness" is 
incoherent or biased or itself "unreasonable," the concept does not do the work we need it to do. 
32. There are a few exceptions (strict liability offenses, for example), but these tend to be 
trivial. 
33. Not impossible, of course, just not terribly likely. Instances of heroism do occur, but they 
seem less common than incidences of cowardice. 
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is probably not a virtue of ordinary, reasonable people. It seems more 
like a virtue belonging to heroes and saints. 
It is for this reason that the drafters of the American Model Penal 
Code abandoned the traditional common law approach to duress, and 
proposed making duress available as a defense to all crimes, including 
homicide. 34 To do otherwise, they stated in the commentary, would be 
both imprudent and unfair: 
law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed ... hypocritical, if it 
imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a 
dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to 
affirm that they should and could comply with if their tum to 
face the problem should arise. Condemnation in such a case is 
bound to be an ineffective threat; what is, however, more 
significant is that it is divorced from any moral base and is 
unjust. 35 
Return to Drazen Erdemovic. Had he not participated in the massacre 
of Muslim civilians, he would almost surely have been killed himself. 
There is, of course, a possibility that his command~r would have spared 
him and allowed him to sit out the massacre, but the possibility must 
have seemed to Erdemovic to be vanishingly small-and even the 
Hague's prosecution team agreed that Erdemovic was reasonable in his 
assessment of the grave danger he faced. 36 And if Erdemovic had 
nonetheless heroically declared, "Go ahead, shoot me, but I won't kill 
these civilians," the civilians would almost surely have been slaughtered 
even without his participation. Here too, there is a faint possibility that 
Erdemovic's refusal to participate might have sparked a broader 
resistance among the other soldiers, but again the possibility was 
vanishingly small; Serb war crimes in Bosnia were numerous and. 
systematic, and it is overwhelmingly likely that with or without 
Erdemovic, and even with or without his comrades in the lOth Sabotage 
!d. 
34. See MPC § 2.09(1): 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute 
an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful 
force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. 
35. MPC § 2.09, explanatory note at 374-75. Dressler proposes an approach similar to that of 
the MPC. Duress, he thinks, should not be precluded as a defense to any crime; the question we 
should ask in determining whether it succeeds as a defense is whether "we could fairly expect a 
person of non-saintly moral strength to resist the threat." Dressler, supra note 24, at 1367. 
36. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementl 
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
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Detachment, the Muslims of Srebrenica would have been slaughtered 
sometime that week. 
So: Erdemovic was effectively faced with a choice.37 He could 
participate in the massacre, and the civilians would die, but he would 
live, or he could refuse to participate and he would die right along with 
the civilian victims. Is it reasonable to expect Erdemovic to have chosen 
other than as he did? 
Under the weak conception of reasonableness-reasonableness as 
ordinariness-Erdemovic was certainly reasonable. Recall his 
anguished question to his commander and comrades when faced with an 
order he knew to ,be unconscionable: As Erdemovic recounted to the 
judges at the Hague, "I said, 'Are you normal? Do you know what you 
are doing?"'38 Sadly, Erdemovic's colleagues were "normal" indeed: 
they were average humans who followed orders and didn't stick their 
necks out to save people they did not know. It was only Erdemovic who 
was atypical enough even to lodge a protest (and even protesting must 
have taken some courage in a unit where others had already been shot 
for disobeying orders). 
Erdemovic's ultimate decision seems to hold up against the more 
rigorous understanding of reasonability, as well. Erdemovic was prudent 
and thoughtful; he correctly assessed the risks and benefits of each 
course of action. Indeed, in a strict utilitarian sense, his participation in 
the massacre may well have minimized the number of deaths, by 
ensuring that ·at least he would not join the victims. On any 
reasonableness standard, Erdemovic appears to have made a defensible 
choice. Asking him to make any other choice is akin to demanding that 
he make a martyr of himself, for no practical purpose. Who among us 
could meet that standard? And if we acknowledge that few of us would 
have ourselves had the courage to accept death rather than participate in 
an atrocity of such magnitude, how can holding Erdemovic liable be 
anything but the sort of hypocrisy decried by the drafters of the 
American Model Penal Code, the sort of hypocrisy that renders law 
meaningless, ineffective and unjust? 
No less a person than Judge Antonio Cassese (no slouch on human 
37. As Dressler observes, older analyses of duress tended to claim that duress was a defense 
because the existence of coercion made the act an involuntary act, or the coercion overbore the 
will. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 24. Most recent commentators have insisted that duress docs 
not negate the voluntariness of the act in a strict sense: the duress actor consciously engages in the 
act. See generally id. Such commentators observe that the actor under duress does not lack a 
choice in the matter of his action; rather, he is faced with a difficult or unfair choice. !d. 
38. See Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case. No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., 
Trial Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdemovic/trialc/ 
judgemcntlerd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
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rights and humanitarian law) takes this view. Writing for the 2-judge 
dissent in Erdemovic, Cassese first disputes the majority's assertion that 
there exists no clear general principle of law on the scope of the duress 
defense. He argues that a "correct" understanding of the case law would 
suggest that duress should be a defense even to charges of murder.39 
Moreover, even if there was no clear principle, given the differing 
common law and civil law standards, Cassese insists that the Tribunal 
ought to have had recourse to the principle most favorable to the 
defendant.40 
More importantly, by declaring that duress cannot be a defense to 
charges of crimes against humanity or war crimes, Cassese suggests, in 
effect, that the majority has abandoned the most basic legal principles.41 
Had Erdemovic "compl[ied] with his legal duty not to shoot innocent 
persons," writes Cassese, "he would [have] forfeit[ed] his life for no 
benefit to anyone and to no effect whatsoever apart from setting a heroic 
example for mankind (which the law cannot demand him to set): his 
sacrifice of his own life would be to no avail."42 Cassese believes that 
this sets the standard unacceptably high: "Law is based on what society 
can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable 
standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of 
martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behavior falling below those 
standards."43 
Given these compelling arguments, how did the plurality on the 
Appeals Chamber justify adopting an apparently anomalous common 
law rule of such obvious harshness? 
The Appeals Chamber was ready enough to acknowledge the 
harshness of its rule, but viewed this harshness as no more than was 
necessary, citing Stephen: "Surely it is at the moment when the 
temptation to crime is strongest that the law should speak most clearly 
and emphatically to the contrary."44 
I want to quote at length here from the plurality opinion: 
[T]he law should not be the product or slave of logic or 
intellectual hair-splitting, but must serve broader normative 
39. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-
96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-adojcas971 007e.htrn (last visited Jan. 18, 2003). 
40. Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdernovic, Case No. 1T-96-22-A, at 
paras. 11-49. 
41.ld. 
42. /d. at para. 44. 
43. /d. at para. 47. 
44. Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdernovic, Case No. 
IT-96-22-A, at para. 74. 
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purposes in light of its social, political and economic role. It is 
noteworthy that the authorities we have just cited [e.g., Stephen] 
issued their cautionary words in respect of domestic society and 
in respect of a range of ordinary crimes including kidnapping, 
assault, robbery and murder. 
Whilst reserving our comments on the appropriate rule for 
domestic national contexts, we cannot but stress that we are not, 
in the International Tribunal, concerned with ordinary domestic 
crimes. The purview of the International Tribunal relates to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in armed 
conflicts of extreme violence with egregious dimensions .... We 
are concerned that, in relation to the most heinous crimes known 
to humankind, the principles of law to which we give credence 
have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers bearing 
weapons of destruction and upon the commanders who control 
them in armed conflict situations. 
The facts of this particular case, for example, involved the cold-
blooded slaughter of 1200 men and boys by soldiers using 
automatic weapons. We must bear in mind that we are operating 
in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one 
of its prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable 
in such a situation where their lives and security are 
endangered .... 
If national law denies recognition of duress as a defense in 
respect of the killing of innocent persons, international criminal 
law can do no less than match that policy since it deals with 
murders often of far greater magnitude. If national law denies 
duress as a defense even in a case in which a single innocent life 
is extinguished due to action under duress, international law, in 
our view, cannot admit duress in cases which involve the 
slaughter of innocent human beings on a large scale. It must be 
our concern to facilitate the development and effectiveness of 
international humanitarian law and to promote its aims and 
application by recognising the normative effect which criminal 
law should have upon those subject to them.45 
Indeed, Security Council Resolution 827, adopted in 1993, 
establishes the International Tribunal expressly as a measure to 
"halt and effectively redress"46 the widespread and flagrant 
45. !d. at para. 75. 
46. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th ·sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 
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violations of international humanitarian law occurring in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia and to contribute thereby to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace.47 
The plurality went on to cite a number of policy reasons for their 
decision,48 insisting that "It would be naive to believe that international 
law operates and develops wholly divorced from considerations of 
social and economic policy.... 'There is no avoiding the essential 
relationship between law and politics'. "49 
Cassese, in his dissent, calls this impermissible judicial law-making: 
In my view international law [on this issue] is not ambiguous or 
uncertain ... [and] to uphold in this area of criminal law the 
concept of recourse to a policy-directed choice is tantamount to 
running foul of the customary principle nul/urn crimen sine lege. 
An international court must apply lex lata, that is to say, the 
existing rules of international law as they are created through the 
sources of the international legal system. If it has instead 
recourse to policy considerations ... it acts ultra vires.50 
In the end, the plurality does not rest its decision upon any pragmatic 
or utilitarian calculus at all, but falls back on pure "moral principles." 
Ultimately, they find themselves relying on the arguments of canonical 
English legal scholars, and quoting from Hale's Pleas of the Crown: "If 
a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot 
otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he will kill an 
innocent person then present, the fear and actual force will not acquit 
him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact for he 
25, 1993), at 29, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). 
47. Cf Regina v. Howe, 2 W.L.R. 568, 582 (1987) (opinion of Lord Hailsham). Responding to 
the argument that earlier prohibitions on the use of duress as a defense to homicide were 
antiquated and unfair in their insistence that it is better to die than take an innocent life, Hailsham 
wrote: "[It) ill becomes those of us who have participated in the cruel events of the 20th century 
to condemn as out of date those who wrote in defence of innocent lives in the 18th century." !d. 
48. Joint and Separate Opinions of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah Opinion, Erdemovic, 
Case No. IT-96-22-A, at para. 73. They reasoned, for instance, that permitting duress as a defense 
to homicide might permit leaders of gangs or terrorist organizations to effectively "immunize" 
their members from prosecution by threatening them with death if they failed to obey the leader's 
orders. ld (internal citations omitted). Similarly, they asserted that precluding duress as a defense 
to murder might make individuals more willing to refuse to kill, knowing they might be punished 
later. ld.(intcmal citations omitted). This seems a weak argument, however, for few people would 
likely see possible future prosecution as more worrisome than imminent death. 
49. !d. at para. 178 (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 5 (1994)). 
50. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, at 
para. 49. 
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ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent."51 And again from 
Blackstone: A ma:n under duress "ought rather to die himself, than 
escape by the murder of an innocent."52 
The plurality opinion acknowledges that an 
argument often advanced by [those] in favour of allowing duress 
as a defence to murder rests upon the assertion that the law 
cannot demand more of a person than what is reasonable, that 
is ... "that which can be expected of the ordinary, average person 
in the particular circumstances ... [The argument goes that] only 
they who possess the quality of heroism will intentionally offer 
their lives for another. Should the criminal law then state that 
compulsion could never be a defence to a charge of murder, it 
would demand that a person who killed another under duress, 
whatever the circumstances, would have to comply with a higher 
standard than that demanded of the average person .... ' 53 
Nevertheless, they note sternly that they reject "utilitarian logic .... 
The approach we take does not involve a balancing of harms for and 
against killing."54 Even if those slaughtered at Srebrenica would have 
died anyway, with or without Erdemovic's participation in the 
massacre, he still should not have taken part, even if it meant his own 
death. Better by far, said the appeals Chamber majority, to be suffer and 
die but be innocent than to taint one's life by committing crimes against 
humanity. To Cassese's claim that this violates "basic principles of 
law," (i.e. law based on what society can reasonably expect of its 
members), the plurality opinion replies, essentially, "What of it?" The 
plurality's position is unyielding: "[O]ur rejection of duress as a defence 
to the killing of innocent human beings does not depend upon what the 
reasonable person is expected to do. We would assert an absolute moral 
postulate which is clear and unmistakable for the implementation of 
international humanitarian law."55 
Implicitly, we have here a statement about the acceptable moral 
contours of a human life, a statement about what it is that makes us 
human beings, without which we might as well be dead. 
51. Joint and Separate Opinions of Judge MacDonald and Judge Vohrah, Prosecutor v. 
Erdcmovic, Case No. IT -96-22-A, at para. 71 (quoting LORD HALE, I PLEAS OF THE CROWN 51 
(I 800)). 
52. /d. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 28 (1857)). 
53. /d. 
54. /d. at para. 83. 
55. /d. at para. 82 (quoting Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland, AC 683, 711 (1975) (opinions 
of Lords Wilberforce and Davies)). Italics added. 
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V. ASSESSING THE DECISION 
How should we feel about this instance when the law seems to ask 
something unreasonable of us-this moment when the law seems to 
require heroism and martyrdom? 
On the one hand, surely Antonio Cassese and the drafters of the 
American Model Penal Code are right to object. Few of us have ever 
been put to the test, and if we were, few of us would likely have done 
any better than Drazen Erdemovic. Can it be either just, fair, or 
reasonable, then, to declare him a criminal and lock him up? 
On the other hand, the plurality decision also has a powerful 
normative pull. True, few of us have been put to the test; but if we were 
to find ourselves in Erdemovic's situation, would we not each hope we 
would have the courage to choose death over participation in the 
slaughter of innocents? And if our courage failed us, would we not each 
feel that we had committed a crime? 
Although I have been sympathetic in this essay to the views of 
Cassese and the Model Penal Code drafters, and although I consider the 
view that duress does not justify homicide to be an interesting anomaly 
in the criminal law, I tend to think that if I had been in the Appeals 
Chamber at the Hague, I would ultimately have joined the plurality 
decision, not Cassese's dissent. As the plurality says, when push comes 
to shove there seems to be an "absolute moral postulate" that says that 
killing innocent people in order to save ones own life is always wrong.56 
But can this view be defended without recourse to foundationalist or 
natural law theories? Is there any way to appeal to an even more robust 
understanding of the reasonable, one that can make the majority 
decision seem fair, and make the traditional common law rule on duress 
seem something other than a natural law island in a utilitarian sea? 
I am not sure, frankly. We might have recourse to a Rawlsian 
conception of public reason,57 as glossed by Alessandro Ferrara, who 
suggests that the product of public reason is "the most reasonable," the 
"exemplary," the "reflective endorsement of our self-conception, an 
idea of who we could be at our best."58 Perhaps a process of public 
reason would indeed lead us to conclude that it is always better to be 
killed than to kill, and that if we fail to make that choice on the spot, we 
would agree that we should be punished, even though our options were 
all bad ones. 
56. /d. at para. 83. 
57. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV 765 (1997). 
58. Alessandro Ferrara, Public Reason and the Normativity of the Reasonable, Comments 
Delivered at the International Conference on Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Prague, May 
II, 2002. 
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Similarly, we might look to Habermasian discourse theory for help. If 
legal norms are those "to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses,"59 could we defend the 
common law rules on duress? It is not obvious that we could if we 
abandon the "exemplary" in favor of agreement based on mere "rational 
discourse." While many participants in such rational discourse might 
agree that it is more noble to choose death over participation in atrocity, 
some would surely resist the notion that the failure to be noble should 
result in punishment as a criminal. 
Where we come out on this has a great deal to do with our 
conceptions of the appropriate temporal framework for understanding 
the events at issue. On the spot, it seems unfair to punish someone as a 
criminal just because he could not quite bring himself to die for the sake 
of a principle. But if we go back far enough-before the choices 
became so stark and unforgiving, before the threat of violence became 
so palpable and imminent-perhaps it is fair after all. Here, taking a 
different temporal view, the focus shifts to how the actor ended up in 
such a bad situation in the first place.60 
Put another way: when we evaluate Drazen Erdemovic's behavior on 
the farm outside Srebrenica, a lot depends on whether we see his story 
as a narrative about inevitability and determinism, or as a narrative 
about choice. To Antonio Cassese, Erdemovic's story is a story about 
inevitability, and the very worst sort of moral luck. Erdemovic was 
caught up in events beyond his control, and he had no more freedom 
than a pawn on chessboard: he was an ordinary man who one day 
simply found himself in an untenable situation. He was as much a 
victim as the murdered Srebrenica civilians. Someone was guilty of a 
terrible crime at Srebrenica, no question-but it was not Drazen 
Erdemovic, young and frightened and anxious about the fate of his wife 
and child. We may assume that to Cassese, the true criminals were the 
likes of Mladic, Karadzic, and Milosevic, the architects of Bosnia's 
ethnic cleansing. 
To the majority, however, Erdemovic's story is (implicitly) a 
narrative about choice. The majority treats Erdemovic as a moral agent 
whose failure was only consummated at Srebrenica, but begun much 
earlier. Erdemovic's crime, on this view, goes back some years; his 
crime was his repeated failure to take a real stand, to insist on loyalty to 
any one group or idea. 
This is ironic, in a conflict replete with crimes committed in the name 
59. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS I 07 ( 1996). 
60. Cf MPC § 209(2). The defense of duress is unavailable if "the actor recklessly placed 
himself in a situation in which it is probable that he would be subjected to duress." !d. 
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of nationalism, ethnicity, religion and other particularist loyalties. 
Erdemovic, unlike many of his comrades in arms, is no particularist 
fanatic. If anything, he is just a little bit too cosmopolitan: he drifts from 
army to army, committed to nothing but unable to bring himself to resist 
wholly. He does not just find himself unaccountably in the heart of 
darkness one day-he has been complicit, little by little, in allowing 
Bosnia to become one of the earth's dark places. By the time he finally 
tries tci take a stand (and as I have said, even questioning his order 
outside Srebrenica undeniably took courage, in an unit in which men 
had already been shot for disobeying orders), it was too late.61 
Erdemovic's cosmopolitan horror at slaughtering civilians just because 
of their different ethnicity gets him nowhere. He then shifts tack and 
tries a particularist appeal, when he suggests to his commander that they 
at least spare a man who has helped other Serbs. But this too fails, as his 
commander says there can "no witnesses" to the slaughter. 62 
Erdemovic was then out of options, leaving nothing but violence and 
terror. Hobbes tells us that the laws of nature require men to do anything 
to preserve their own lives.63 For Erdemovic, the Hague Tribunal is far 
away, and so he gives in to his own survival instincts and to the 
sovereign's command-which is to say that he obeys the man with the 
gun who controls the other men with guns. 
But despite his commander's insistence that there be no witnesses, 
Erdemovic, by turning his back on the cosmopolitan ideals of Rawls and 
Habermas and obeying instead Hobbes' darker conception of law, 
survives to be a witness himself. And certainly this is one way to 
understand this case: as a story about the redemptive possibilities of 
witnessing. If Erdemovic had not valued his own life a little bit more 
than a hero ought to value his own life, there might have been no one 
who was later willing and able to tell the tale of how the Bosnian Serb 
Army systematically slaughtered thousands of Srebrenica civilians. 
Erdemovic's fellow soldiers were able, but unwilling to implicate 
themselves; the victims would have been willing, but, being dead, they 
were not able. 
Erdemovic's moral ambivalence proved crucial here: he was 
conscience-stricken enough to recognize the massacre as a terrible 
crime, and if he was not quite conscience-stricken enough to prefer 
61. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. 
IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
erdemovic/appeal/judgement/crd-adojcas971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003). 
62. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. 1T-96-22·A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, 
Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdcmovic/appea1/judgcment/erd-
aj971007c.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
63. And it is thus folly to make laws against their doing so. 
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death to the moral taint of participation, he was sufficiently conscience-
stricken to confess to the first journalist he could find when the war 
ended, sufficiently conscience-stricken to confess once more at the 
Hague and plead guilty, and sufficiently conscience-stricken to provide 
critical information to Tribunal investigators that could help them 
prepare indictments against numerous more important suspects, such as 
General Ratko Mladic and Republica Srpska President Radovan 
Karadzic. As the prosecution team at the Hague Tribunal 
acknowledged, without Drazen Erdemovic's eyewitness account of the 
massacre (later corroborated by forensic experts who examined the site) 
and his detailed description of the command structure of the Bosnian 
Serb Army, the Tribunal's efforts to build cases against the numerous 
much bigger fish would have been far more difficult. Perhaps, then, the 
very moral weakness that enabled Erdemovic's survival also enabled 
him to do something morally good: bear witness to the crimes in which 
he had taken part, and honor the victims by acknowledging the horror of 
their deaths. 
If the story of Prosecutor v. Erdemovic is a story about one man's 
moral failure, partially redeemed by the process of bearing witness, it 
can also be read as a parable about of the international community, its 
half-hearted institutional efforts to address and prevent atrocities, and 
the limits and possibilities of law. 
The Hague Tribunal was the ultimate cosmopolitan institution, with 
all that is glorious and all that is troubling about cosmopolitan 
institutions. Its establishment by the United Nations Security Council in 
1993 represented the first major international judicial effort to punish 
and deter atrocities since the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals nearly 
fifty years earlier. Its formation was linked in the minds of many of its 
creators with the long-term goal of creating a permanent international 
criminal court, one that could truly act as the conscience of humankind 
and ensure the end of impunity for human rights abusers. But the 
Tribunal also suffered from its very cosmopolitanism: a creature of the 
UN bureaucracy, it was accountable to no one in particular, unrooted in 
any legal or political culture, unable to connect in any meaningful way 
to the people whose lives it claimed to effect. Since it depended upon 
the military muscle and intelligence reports of its Security Council 
sponsors, the Tribunal was, by itself, nearly toothless: it couldn't get the 
NATO powers to arrest any of its most wanted but still politically useful 
criminals. 
Of course, though its coercive powers were minimal, the Tribunal 
could, and did, lock up former Private Erdemovic. Was its decision to 
declare Erdemovic a criminal in part an act of expiation for law's 
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failings-for the failure of human rights and humanitarian law to live up 
to its promises, and the failure of the international community to care 
enough to stop the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia? 
Certainly there was plenty of moral failure to go around during the 
Bosnian war, and the massacre of seven thousand Srebrenica civilians in 
July 1995 represents one of the international community's most glaring 
and shameful failures during the conflict. But there is almost no mention 
in any of the Appeals Chamber opinions in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic of 
the institutional and political context in which the Srebrenica massacre 
occurred. In a case that could be read as a parable about moral 
cowardice and the (possibly) redemptive aspects of bearing witness, the 
Tribunal's silence about this is loud indeed. 
Recall that in 1995, unable to summon the political will to take sides 
in the Bosnian conflict or impose a peace, but dogged by media reports 
of atrocities against civilians, the UN Security Council came up with the 
idea of declaring certain areas within Bosnia UN "safe areas," to which 
civilians could go and be protected by UN peacekeeping troops. 
Srebrenica was one such "safe area," and in the summer of 1995 
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians poured into Srebrenica to seek 
protection from the incursions of the Bosnian Serb army and 
paramilitaries. As the plurality opinion in the Erdemovic case dryly 
notes, however, the Dutch UN troops protecting the "safe area" of 
Srebrenica (the judges had enough sense of shame to keep the term in 
quotation marks) surrendered their weapons to the Serbs and withdrew 
rather than risk a fight. It was their abandoned civilian charges who 
were brought by the busload for Erdemovic and his fellow soldiers to 
slaughter. 
Naturally, none of the Dutch UN peacekeepers were ever brought up 
on criminal charges for their failure to protect the civilians they were 
pledged to protect, and no high-ranking UN officials were charged as 
accomplices in the murder of the thousands who died, and none of the 
Security Council powers who gave the UN leaders their marching 
orders will ever truly be called to account. 64 Peacekeeping soldiers and 
their political leaders are protected by a web of ad hoc and treaty-based 
immunities from prosecution, and for the most part this is probably as it 
should be. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that had these immunities 
been absent, and had ordinary common law principles of criminal 
liability applied, some or all of these actors might well be considered 
criminally liable for the deaths of the thousands of massacred 
64. The Dutch cabinet faced a belated political reckoning in the wake of a recent report about 
Srebrenica, which led ultimately to a rash of resignations. See Srebrenica Muslims to request UN, 
Dutch responsibility before ICJ, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Apr. 21, 2002. 
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Srebrenica civilians.65 Certainly, the Srebrenica massacre could not 
have occurred without countless political and moral failures of the first 
order made by people and institutions with far more power and 
information than Private Drazen Erdemovic. 
By declaring that under international law, duress is not a defense to 
charges of killing innocent people, and by sentencing Drazen 
Erdemovic to prison, perhaps the Hague Tribunal was acknowledging 
these collective failures in the only way available-even at the risk of 
appearing breathtakingly hypocritical. After the failure of the 
international community to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, and the 
embarrassing failure of the Tribunal to get its hands on any high-
ranking suspects, how could the Tribunal permit the very first defendant 
brought before it-a man who admitted killing 70 to 100 innocent 
people-to walk free? Punishing Erdemovic was the Tribunal's sole 
mechanism for honoring the pain of the victims at Srebrenica. Thus, the 
eloquent plurality opinion insisting on "absolute moral postulates" and 
declaring that not even the desire to avoid one's own death could justify 
atrocities. This allowed the majority on the Appeals Chamber to use law 
itself as a mechanism for bearing witness to the inexcusable moral 
failures of our collective institutions. 
VI. BACK TO ERDEMOVIC 
All very well, but despite the numerous and collective moral failures, 
only Drazen Erdemovic went to prison. Someone had to be punished, 
and he was available, the sacrificial lamb. So, back to Erdemovic: what 
did he make of the whole business? 
The Tribunal's insistence that duress is no defense to the killing of 
innocent people may seem to create an international legal standard more 
suitable for heroes and saints than for ordinary mortals. But Erdemovic 
himself seemed to have agreed with the majority's view of the issue. 
During his sentencing hearing in November 1996, he wept as he 
explained to the judges why he had decided to plead guilty, despite his 
conviction that he had acted under duress. At Srebrenica, he said, 
[My commander] said, "If you do not want to [participate in the 
executions], stand with them ... so that we can kill you too ... " I 
65. Although ordinarily omissions do not give rise to criminal liability, the peacekeepers 
stood in a special relationship to the civilians, arguably had something analogous to a contractual 
duty to protect them, and certainly promised to protect them, effectively dissuading the civilians 
from seeking to escape the region as they might have done had no claims about "safe areas" been 
made. 
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was not afraid for myself at that point, not that much ... but what 
would happen to my child and to my wife? So there was this 
enormous burden falling on my shoulders .. .I knew that I would 
be killing people, that I could not hide this, that this would be 
burning at my conscience. . . 66 
[My attorney] told me, "Drazen, can you change your mind, your 
decision [to plead guilty]? .. .! do not know what will happen .... " 
[But] I told him because of those victims, because of my 
consciousness, because of my life, because of my child ·and my 
wife, I cannot change what I said ... because of the peace of my 
mind, my soul, my honesty, because of the victims and war and 
because of everything. 
Although I knew that my family, my parents, my brother, my 
sister would have problems because of that, I did not want to 
change it. Because of everything that happened I feel terribly 
sorry, but I could not do anything .... Thank you. I have nothing 
else to say.67 
In July 1995 Erdemovic could not bring himself to say to his 
commander, "Go ahead, shoot me, because if I participate in this 
massacre something in me will die anyway." But afterwards, ~e all but 
turned himself over to the authorities, and pled guilty. Had he not come 
forward voluntarily and confessed, he would likely never have been 
found or prosecuted, and had he not pled guilty he would almost 
certainly never have been convicted; the only evidence against him was 
his own words, and the prosecutors at the Hague had better things to do 
than go after young privates. Perhaps for Erdemovic, pleading 
guilty-and accepting his sentence-was part of restoring his sense of 
himself as a moral person. Perhaps, from his own point of view, 
suffering his sentence (he ultimately served five years) was necessary to 
redemption. 
VII. WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE? 
The story of Drazen Erdemovic's life and trial is full of painful 
ambiguities. This may lead some to dismiss its significance, either on 
the "hard facts make bad law" theory, or on the theory that the situation 
66. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementl 
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). 
67. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-
96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997) at para. II, available at http://www.un.org 
/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojste971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). 
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Erdemovic faced was so extreme that it offers no lessons for the rest of 
us ordinary people: we, after all, are not soldiers, and not in a war, so 
what can Erdemovic's story possibly have to teach us? 
But it is the very ambiguities in this story that should give us pause. 
First, the story of Erdemovic should raise serious questions about how 
far apart "ordinary life" really is from the heart of darkness. For Drazen 
Erdemovic and his fellow soldiers at Srebrenica, the darkness crept up 
slowly and imperceptibly. One day Bosnian Muslims were neighbors 
and friends, and only a short time later, the "normal" men of the 101h 
Sabotage Detachment were willing to slaughter their former neighbors 
without hesitation. Only for Erdemovic was the darkness visible, and 
even he was unable to resist its pull. 
Erdemovic's story seems extreme, but the last century suggests that 
there is not a sharp disjuncture between the ordinary and the extreme. 
We often prefer to imagine wars and genocides and atrocities as events 
that "just happen" every now and then, much like tornadoes or 
lightening strikes; this metaphor suggests that we can't generalize from 
them, since they are radically discontinuous with ordinary life. This is 
dangerously misleading, however. Genocides and atrocities do not "just 
happen": some people work very hard over a long time to make them 
happen, and others permit them to happen by averting their eyes or 
failing to cry out against the encroachment of darkness. 
Today we Americans are in a "war against terrorism." Without 
wishing to be too apocalyptic, I would suggest that this is a time for us 
to be particularly alert to the risks of sliding towards the extremes. 
Government encroachments on civil liberties; a rise in hate crimes 
against Muslims and Arabs; a growing popular sentiment that 
"anything" is justified in the name of national security-all of these are 
danger signs. The press has reported on allegations that American 
soldiers in Afghanistan beat and abused prisoners (including some 
prisoners who turned out to be US allies, captured in error). 68 Similarly, 
there have been recent reports that U.S. government personnel have 
tortured Al Qaeda suspects at secret interrogation centers in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere.69 Without additional evidence, there is no reason to 
assume that these allegations are true. But after a century that has seen 
so many atrocities committed by so many ordinary people, there is also 
no reason to assume that the allegations are false. 
68. See, e.g., Eric Slater, Response To Terror; U.S. Forces Beat Afghans After Deadly Assault, 
Ex-Prisoners Say; War: Reports Add To Evidence Suggesting That The Attack Targeted Innocent 
People. L.A. TIMES, Feb. II, 2002, at A I. 
69. See, e.g., Don van Natta, Threats And Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror 
Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World. New York Times, March 9, 2003, at AI. 
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Keeping all this in mind, what I earlier described as an anomaly in 
domestic criminal law may make more sense. In common law 
jurisdictions, duress is a generally a complete defense to all 
crimes-except for murder. This is puzzling if we think that "ordinary 
life" always remains ordinary, for if it does, why not just be consistent, 
and allow the duress defense across the board? If we realize that the 
ordinary can become extreme in the blink of an eye, however, the 
refusal to permit duress as a defense to the murder of innocents seems 
less an anomaly than a stern warning of how easily events may slide out 
of control. Perhaps the rule is meant to say to us, "If you find yourself 
having to choose between killing an innocent person and preserving 
your own life, you have already chosen wrong." Perhaps the rule is 
meant to draw our attention to the slipperiness of the descent into 
darkness. 
Even so, if this is all that the law can do for us, the optimistic dream 
of using reason and law to reach into the dark places of the earth is still 
far, far from being realized. Not all our law or all our philosophy were 
of much use to Drazen Erdemovic as he faced his commander on the 
farm outside Srebrenica. Reason and law still seem to lack sufficient 
normative force in the face of violence and terror: they provide us with 
what appears to be prospective guidance on how we should behave in 
some hypothetical future, and retrospective guidance on how we ought 
to have behaved in the past, but little guidance when we're actually on 
the spot. 
"Inter arma silent legis," Cicero said famously: in time of war, the law 
is silent. The project of advancing human rights and humanitarian law is 
dedicated to eliminating that silence, but it has not yet succeeded in 
doing so, and perhaps it never will succeed; Erdemovic, alone at the eye 
of the storm, heard not even a still small voice. There was no law for 
Erdemovic, or for those he so unwillingly killed: only power, and fear. 
Law came later. 
